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Many fear China’s accession to WTO will impoverish its rural people, via greater import 
competition in its agricultural markets. We explore that possibility bearing in mind that, even if 
producer prices of some (land-intensive) farm products fall, prices of other (labour-intensive) farm 
products could rise. Also, the removal of restrictions on exports of textiles and clothing could boost 
town and village enterprises, so demand for unskilled labour for non-farm work in rural areas may 
grow even if demand for farm labour in aggregate falls. New estimates, from the global, economy-
wide numerical simulation model known as GTAP, of the likely changes in agricultural and other 
product prices as a result of WTO accession are drawn on to examine empirically the factor reward 
implications of China’s WTO accession. The results suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern 
income inequality may well rise within China but rural-urban income inequality need not. The 
paper concludes with some policy suggestions for alleviating any pockets of farm household 
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After fifteen years of negotiations, China acceded to the WTO at the end of 2001. During those 
negotiations, China was continually opening up its economy. However, substantial economic policy 
reform is still needed before the transition from plan to market is complete. Some of those 
remaining reforms will be introduced over the next few years to fulfil the legal obligations China 
has committed to in its WTO Protocol of Accession.  
 
Keeping the momentum of growth-enhancing trade reform going requires convincing sceptics that 
there will not be significant losers. Yet such reform necessarily involves structural adjustments by 
households, firms and bureaucracies. While the economy as a whole can gain substantially from 
those adjustments,
1 losses and even hardship can result for some households unless complementary 
domestic policies are in place to facilitate adjustment and/or compensate losers. That underscores 
the importance of first analysing the likely distributional consequences of the reforms themselves, 
and then considering what complementary policies are needed to provide adequate safety nets for 
potential losers. Of particular concern in China’s case is that farm incomes may fall, exacerbating 
the rise since the mid-1980s in farm-nonfarm and inland-coastal aggregate income inequality and 
possibly reversing the decline since the late 1970s in rural poverty (see Kanbur and Zhang 2001). 
 
The policy changes still to be made to fulfil WTO obligations will affect all areas of China’s 
economy. Numerous commentators predict a dramatic effect on agriculture and hence rural areas, 
because the reforms in China over much of the past quarter-century bypassed the country’s trade 
policies for key farm products. Before acceding to WTO, China was required by its trading partners 
to commit to major changes in those farm trade policies by 2005 – protection cuts that appear far 
greater, and faster, than any other developing country was required to commit to in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture. With one-quarter of rural households in China living on less than 
$1 a day in 1999 (c.f. 1 per cent of urban households) such that more than three-quarters of all poor 
Chinese people live in rural areas, concerns about the impact of WTO accession on poverty 
alleviation are understandable. 
 
Meeting the commitments in agriculture will directly affect China’s farm sector plus its food, feed 
and fibre processors, as well as consumers of food and beverages. Imports of numerous land-
intensive farm products may increase, and most observers presume that will put downward pressure 
on prices received by China’s farmers. However, reduced protectionism may boost output and 
exports of some labour-intensive farm products in which China still has a comparative advantage.
2 
In addition, farm households will be affected indirectly by many of the other commitments China 
                                                 
1 Although national gains from trade are not guaranteed while there are major domestic policy distortions in place, such 
as in the labour market. See, for example, Krishna and Yavas (2002). 
2 The difficulties China has had in exporting food products to, for example, Japan, Korea and the United Kingdom in 
the past year or so because of those countries’ quarantine/SPS measures should ease following WTO accession, or at 
least be challengeable under WTO Dispute Settlement provisions. They are ignored in the empirical analysis below, as 
is the possibility that China itself may use quarantine measures to limit its imports of farm products.   2
has made in its WTO Accession Protocol. Especially important will be the arrangements for 
phasing out the ‘voluntary’ export restraints on China’s textile and clothing trade, and the 
reductions in protection of the motor vehicles and parts industry. So too will be the myriad 
commitments affecting the services sector, including state trading enterprises. Those changes, 
together with the promised increase in a wide range of agricultural imports, will allow China to 
exploit more fully its strong comparative advantage in unskilled labour-intensive products – both 
farm and non-farm (Anderson 1990, 1992; Huang et al. 2000).  
 
To assess the impact on farmer incomes and on rural areas of the remaining reforms required to 
meet China’s commitments to the WTO membership, it is necessary to see those changes in the 
context of on-going economic growth and structural change. This paper therefore begins with a 
brief summary of rural developments since the initial reforms began in the late 1970s, of recent 
policies affecting rural households, and of pertinent reforms still to be delivered as part of China’s 
WTO commitments. With that background, the paper then provides some indication of the likely 
effects on the welfare of different factor markets and hence different types of households of the 
reforms to be implemented between 2002 and 2007. Even the direction, let alone the magnitude, of 
some of the effects cannot be discerned from theory (Winters 2000; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 
2001), so we use the numerical simulation model known as GTAP to address these issues. The 
paper concludes by drawing out implications for Chinese policy makers wishing to pre-empt any 





Rural developments since the late 1970s  
 
The unilateral decision in December 1978 to open up the Chinese economy was a major stimulus to 
economic growth: the pre-reform rate of per capita GDP growth of 3.1 per cent per year more than 
doubled, and has remained above 7 per cent for the past two decades (final row of Table 1). Rapid 
economic growth is normally accompanied by a relative decline in the farm sector, but in China that 
was initially tempered by the introduction of the farm household responsibility system (which led to 
the replacement of collective farms with individually managed holdings), and by the raising of 
prices received by farmers. So began the process of moving away from the taxing of agriculture 
relative to other sectors – a process followed by most of the advanced economies in the early stages 
of their industrialization (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Lindert 1991). 
 
Agriculture grew nearly as rapidly as industry from 1979 to 1984. However, the one-off efficiency 
effects of moving to the household responsibility system and raising relative prices for farm 
products were mostly reaped by the mid-1980s, after which agriculture grew at only one-third the 
pace of industry and less than half that of the service sector as industrialization boomed with the 
development of Special Economic Zones on the eastern seaboard (Table 1). Employment, output 
and exports of rural township and village enterprises, meanwhile, have boomed (Table 2). Despite 
that migration of farm workers to rural industrial and service activities (not to mention the 
unauthorised migration to urban jobs such as in construction), the average farm size and the share of 
farm household income from farming have fallen steadily since the late 1970s (final two columns of 
Table 2). Table 3 shows the slowdown in the decline in agriculture’s shares of GDP and 
employment in the 1980s, and its subsequent acceleration in the 1990s. 
 
Income growth has boosted the demand for foods that are high in protein and nutrients relative to 
those high in carbohydrates, which has stimulated major structural changes within agriculture as   3
farmers responded to changes in domestic demand. For example, livestock and fish increased their 
share of agricultural output from less that one-fifth in the late 1970s to two-fifths by the late 1990s 
(Table 3), while within the crop sub-sector, fruit and vegetable production grew two to three times 
as fast as grain output (Table 1). The prices and marketing of grain and oilseed products have 
continued to be highly regulated, whereas markets for horticultural, livestock and fish products have 
been greatly liberalized. This has accentuated the growth in output of the latter group relative to 
grain and oilseed output since the mid-1980s (Table 1). Meanwhile, the direct consumption of grain 
by rural as well as urban households has virtually ceased growing (Table 4) -- a consequence not 
only of incomes rising but also of population growth slowing to less than 1 percent per year and of 
cuts in the implicit consumption subsidy for foodgrains. 
 
The use of grain for animal feeds continues to grow. To date that has been supplied almost 
completely by rising domestic production, such that the trend level of grain self sufficiency has 
remained close to 100 per cent. Table 5 shows that there are nonetheless considerable changes from 
year to year in grain exports and imports. It also shows that, overall, China has remained a net 
exporter of food and feed, with meat, fish, fruit and vegetables providing most of the growth in net 
export earnings. However, soybean imports grew substantially when the government (in 
anticipation of WTO accession) lowered the out-of-quota tariff from 114 per cent to 3 per cent in 
2000 and raised the import quota (from 3 to more than 10 mmt per year). 
 
Recent and prospective policies affecting rural areas 
 
As in most developing countries,
3   agriculture in China was squeezed at early stages of 
industrialization with gross fiscal contributions to the sector being more than outweighed by 
implicit taxation in the form of depressed prices for farm products, neglect of public infrastructure 
in rural relative to urban areas, and capital outflows via the financial system (Huang and Ma 1998). 
Then price and other market reforms associated with China’s policy shift from a socialist to a 
market-oriented economy began to be introduced, starting with non-strategic commodities such as 
vegetables, fruit, fish, livestock, and oil and sugar crops.  The aims of the early reforms were to 
raise farm level prices and gradually deregulate the market. As the right to private trading was 
extended to include surplus output of all categories of agricultural products after contractual 
obligations to the state were fulfilled, the foundations of the state marketing system began to be 
undermined (Rozelle et al. 1997). Despite periodic stop-go cycles in the reform process, the 
proportion of retail commodities sold at market prices has kept rising. According to Lardy (2001), 
the share for agriculture was just 6 per cent in 1978 but had risen to 40 per cent by 1985, 79 per cent 
by 1995 and 83 per cent by 1999. 
 
What have these policies meant for nominal rates of agricultural protection in China (the percentage 
by which domestic prices exceed prices at the country’s border)? Table 6 shows new estimates 
based on quota and negotiated procurement prices and on wholesale market prices for key 
agricultural commodities for some recent years. It suggests rice, meat, fish and fruit and vegetables 
have been priced at less than border prices while other grains, oilseeds, sugar, cotton and milk have 
been priced at one-fifth to two-fifths above border prices. Maize and cotton also enjoyed export 
subsidies in 2001 (amounting to one-third and one-tenth of f.o.b. prices, respectively).  
 
Table 6 also shows what China has committed to in its WTO Protocol of Accession: tariff rate 
quota will apply to grains, sugar and cotton for which out-of-quota tariffs are quite high, but 
                                                 
3 See Sah and Stiglitz (1992) and Anderson (1995).   4
otherwise, after the phase-in period, the tariffs range between just 1 and 15 per cent – representing 
substantial liberalizations over 2001 levels. As well, producers of major crops may continue to be 
affected by commodity-specific policies of government procurement of a portion of the crop at 
lower than market prices (as in the past – see Sicular 1988) or at higher than market prices (as in 
1998 – see Huang 1998 and Lu 1999).  
 
What will those reforms mean for agricultural trade? Many analysts have been expecting China to 
become ever-more dependent on agricultural imports in the course of the economy’s rapid 
industrialization over the past two-plus decades. Some extremists (e.g., Brown 1995) have even 
suggested China could seriously deprive other developing countries of food. Yet as reported above, 
net food import growth has not yet happened, at least not in a sustained way, and China has 
continued to be a net exporter of meat, fish, fruit and vegetables. Indeed on occasions in the latter 
1990s, China also was a net exporter of grain and cotton (Table 5). How much of that is due to 
government policies that constrained domestic demand, including occasional export subsidies, is a 
moot point.  
 
In its WTO Protocol of Accession, China has agreed to have no agricultural export subsidies, and to 
limit its domestic support to farmers to 8.5% of the value of production (compared with 10% for 
other developing countries). The import market access commitments China has made to WTO 
members look substantial on paper. Tariff rate quotas will be retained only on wheat, rice, maize, 
edible oils, sugar, cotton and wool, domestic production of which in aggregate comprises only 
about one-sixth of China’s agricultural GDP. The quota volumes are to grow over the next three 
years at annual rates ranging from 5 to 19 per cent. A further commitment by China is that state 
trading monopolies will disappear (except for tobacco): even though some state trading enterprises 
will continue to operate, there will be an increasing degree of competition from private firms in the 
importing and exporting of farm products from now on. 
 
Farmers and the rural sector more broadly will be affected also by China’s commitment to provide 
improved and WTO-bound market access for industrial products. Mineral and manufacturing tariffs 
will be bound and generally reduced on a broad basis, with many tariffs falling to 10% or less. 
Tariffs will be cut on accession and further cuts will be phased in by 2005 (with just a few 
exceptions). Furthermore, for industrial products, China will reduce significantly its non-tariff 
measures and eliminate all quotas, tendering and import licensing on non-farm merchandise by no 
later than 2005. Quotas on Chinese imports of automobiles and parts will grow by 15% annually 
from a level of around US$6 billion in 2000, and these quotas will be eliminated by 2005. For 
textiles and clothing, however, the current ‘voluntary’ export restraints will not be completely 
phased out until the end of 2008. Substantial commitments to open up services markets in China 
also have been made. 
 
Over the 1990s the average scheduled tariff rates for manufacturing initially exceeded but fell more 
than for agriculture, and by 2005 the manufacturing average will be well below that for agriculture 
(a simple average of 7 per cent, versus 17 per cent for agriculture). That does not give a true 
indication of the extent of change in protection that is taking place, though, because in the 1990s 
many manufactures have been entering China at reduced or zero tariffs via duty drawbacks, to 
encourage foreign investment in processing of imported intermediate goods for subsequent export. 
Some agricultural products also have entered at less than the scheduled rate, including through 
smuggling. 
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What all this means for incentives for each industry is difficult to discern precisely, but it provides 
better information than has been available to date for analysing empirically the economic effects of 
the reforms associated with China’s WTO accession, including the impact on factor rewards and 
prices from which inferences about income distributional effects can be made. We do this bearing in 
mind the marked differences in per capita incomes between eastern, central and western provinces, 
and between urban and rural areas (as shown in Tables 7 and 8, and in Kanbur and Zhang 2001).  
 
Applying the GTAP model 
Version 5 of the computable general equilibrium model of the global economy known as GTAP is 
used here.
4  Being an economy-wide model, GTAP describes both the vertical and horizontal 
linkages between all product markets within the model's individual countries and regions as well as 
between countries and regions via their bilateral trade flows. For present purposes the 1997 data 
base is aggregated to 25 sectors and 20 regions and projected forward first to 2001 and then to 
2007, using World Bank projections of population, income, and factor endowments (see Appendix 
Table A). The initial base case assumes China retains its protection policies as of 1995 and Taiwan 
retains its protection as of 1997, but that all other countries fully implement their Uruguay Round 
obligations on schedule before 2005. China’s trade policy changes between 1995 and 2001 are 
assumed to have been in anticipation of the requirements of, and hence part of, China’s WTO 
accession. These are analysed in detail in Ianchovichina and Martin (2002), together with the effects 
of implementing over the next few years the remainder of China’s commitments as recorded in its 
WTO Protocol of Accession.
5 In this paper we focus on just the additional reform commitments to 
be implemented between 2001 and 2007 (relative to the revised base case in which China’s reforms 
only up to 2001 are in place and there are no further reforms to 2007). For key agricultural import 
policies these remaining reform commitments are assumed to shift nominal rates of protection 
(NRPs) from column 3 to column 6 of Table 6. As well, the export subsidies in place in 2001 (34 
per cent for maize, 10 per cent for cotton) are to be eliminated, and we assume no new farm 
production subsidies are introduced (even though China’s WTO Protocol of Accession allows it to 
provide up to an aggregate level of support of 8.5 per cent).
6 The choices of new agricultural NRPs 
fall into three categories: no change if they were negative in 2001 (rice, meats, vegetables and 
fruits), a move to part-way between the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs if the TRQs bite (wheat, 
coarse grains, cotton), and otherwise a move to the new in-quota tariffs (oilseeds, sugar, milk). 
Sensitivity of the results concerning the first two categories are explored in the qualifications 
section, however. 
If this reform were to require a movement of unskilled labour out of farm activities, three 
impediments need to be kept in mind. One is that those farm workers would be less than perfect 
substitutes for those already in non-farm pursuits. Econometric work in an earlier version of Sicular 
and Zhao (2002) suggests that restraint on mobility could be modelled via a CET function with an 
                                                 
4 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is a multi-regional, static, applied general equilibrium model based 
on neo-classical microeconomic theory including full employment of all factors of production, constant returns to scale 
and perfect competition.  See Hertel (1997) for comprehensive documentation. The Version 5 data base is described at 
www.gtap.org. The model is solved with GEMPACK software, described in Harrison and Pearson (1996). 
5 A particularly important feature of their analysis is the inclusion of China’s duty exemptions in the base scenario, 
because otherwise the model would overstate the gains from tariff reductions. Tariff cuts are from 2001 applied rates to 
post-accession bound rates (or zero if the latter exceed the former). In this application the aggregate trade balance and 
government tax revenue are both assumed to remain a fixed share of GDP. The 2001 trade data are from COMTRADE, 
and the 2001 applied tariffs for China are from CDS Consulting Co. (2002). 
6 Three non-farm reforms of importance are worthy of mention. The ‘voluntary’ export restraint on China’s textile and 
clothing exports to the U.S. and EU, expressed in the base scenario as taxes on those exports, are removed; restructuring 
of the motor vehicles and parts industry following WTO accession is modelled as a 20 per cent productivity boost to 
vehicle assembly, following Francois (2002); and liberalization of China’s services trade also follows Francois (2002).   6
elasticity of transformation of 1.3.
7 We have therefore incorporated that in the GTAP model for 
China. Another impediment to off-farm migration is that urban social welfare benefits such as 
subsidies to housing, food, education and health care are not available to non-urban people, except 
by purchasing a residence permit, or hukou (Zhao 1999). And the third impediment is that farm 
workers who permanently cut their ties with the rural sector may lose entitlement to returns from 
their family’s land, and even the direct support and assistance of family members (Hussain 2001). 
These latter two impediments have contributed to the persistence of a very large gap in farm versus 
non-farm returns to unskilled labour. Even after adjusting for differences in work effort, Shi 
Xinzeng (2002) estimates that gap to be one-third of the urban unskilled wage.
8 We have thus 
assumed that gap will persist even if workers do move off the farm in the initial simulation 
(although the sensitivity of the results to that assumption is explored in the qualifications section). 
The closure adopted here is a long-run one in which, in addition to the above assumptions about 
farm labour, nonfarm labour is mobile between nonfarm sectors, capital is mobile between sectors, 
and agricultural land is mobile between industries within the agricultural sector. This closure differs 
from some of the other papers for this project, where short-run assumptions about factor mobility 
are assumed. 
With these modifications to the GTAP model, what results emerge from implementing after 2001 
the remainder of China’s commitments to WTO members? Here we focus on comparing farm 
versus non-farm results. This is not quite the same as rural versus urban, given the large and 
growing amount of non-farm rural activities (Table 2), but it is the best we can do with the GTAP 
model which does not distinguish activities by location within a country.
9 
What results can we anticipate?  
In a recent paper, Carter and Estrin (2001) develop a model with two sectors, agriculture and non-
agriculture, that assumes capital is sector-specific and labour is intersectorally mobile. They assume 
the trade reform from China’s WTO accession will lower the relative price of non-farm goods 
(larger tariff cuts for non-farm than farm products). If the economy started from equilibrium in the 
labour market, that price change would lower labour’s wage in terms of farm goods and would 
cause labour to migrate from non-farm to farm activities. If, however, the economy starts from a 
situation in which farm workers face impediments to migrating to non-farm employment, the wage 
in the non-farm sector would have exceeded that in agriculture. In that case, a fall in the relative 
price of non-farm products would lower the non-farm wage without changing the low farm wage (if 
both are again measured in terms of agricultural goods). There would then be an additional gain 
from trade reform, namely from reducing the distortion in the labour market. If the government 
were to simultaneously remove the barrier to out-migration of farm labour, yet another welfare gain 
would accrue to the overall economy. Farm workers would benefit from trade reform alone in so far 
as they consume non-farm products whose price is lower after that policy change. They would 
benefit even more if the restraint on their migration were to be lifted. Non-farm workers, however, 
would suffer wage cuts in terms of farm products from each of those two policy changes, cuts that 
may more or less than offset the fall in the price of non-farm products they consume. Carter and 
Estrin therefore conclude that China’s rural-urban income inequality (at least for labourers) would 
                                                 
7  In a more recent version, Sicular and Zhao (2002) estimate this elasticity to be closer to 2.67. For details see 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2002) who conducted sensitivity analysis and found that results are robust to changes in this 
elasticity. 
8 Recent work by Sicular and Zhao (2002) implies this gap to be 44 percent and suggest that the confidence interval 
around this estimate is large. Given the large degree of uncertainty associated with this estimate, we continue to employ 
the 34 percent tax wedge implied by Shi Xinzheng’s work.  
9 For a more-detailed breakdown showing both farm and non-farm rural households, see Hertel, Zhai and Wang (2002).   7
be reduced from further trade liberalization and more so if the current policies that inhibit off-farm 
migration were relaxed. 
Neat though the Carter/Estrin analysis is, it ignores the differences between skilled, unskilled non-
farm and unskilled farm workers. Also, its assumption that the incentive to produce non-farm 
relative to farm products will fall following WTO accession needs to be tested, since there will be 
some positive and some negative changes to the price of both sets of highly tradable products. 
Furthermore, the demand for difficult-to-trade products will rise following the income gains from 
trade reform, and their cost of production will change. Does the Carter and Estrin conclusion, that 
WTO accession will reduce rural-urban income inequality, hold up when account is taken of these 
facts in a detailed empirical model such as GTAP? And how would poverty be affected, bearing in 
mind that there are considerable differences between the production structures and per capita 
incomes of western, central and eastern provinces (Table 7), rural incomes are only one-third of 
urban ones (Table 8), and 85 per cent of rural households in the bottom quartile of the income 
distribution are agricultural (Sicular and Zhao 2002)? 
 
What do the results show? 
 
Our analysis begins with the core accession scenario, and then is followed by three variations on 
that core scenario. 
 
The core WTO accession scenario 
 
To begin with the bottom line of the main scenario before revealing the details, the core empirical 
results suggest the opposite conclusion to Carter and Estrin’s. The main reason for the difference is 
that the GTAP model suggests the relative producer prices not only of farm products but also of 
textiles will be lower rather than higher in 2007 following the completion of WTO accession 
reforms, compared with what they would be without those remaining reforms (Table 9). Relative 
prices are lower for textiles -- despite the removal of the ‘voluntary’ export restraint on sales of 
those products to the U.S. and European Union – for three reasons: because the demand for labour 
on farms is lower which lowers the cost of unskilled labour in manufacturing, because import taxes 
on the intermediate inputs used in those manufacturing activities are lower due to the accession 
process, and because the real exchange rate effect of the tariff reductions lowers the cost of 
nontraded goods and other factors used as inputs in production.  
The lower cost structure in unskilled labour intensive manufacturing activities by 2007 causes the 
quantity of unskilled non-farm labour demanded to be greater (by 0.8 per cent); but lower farm 
product prices mean the quantity of unskilled farm labour demanded is less (by 1.7 per cent). A 
consequence of the reform is a 0.7 per cent fall in the real wage for unskilled farm labour, and a rise 
in real wages for unskilled non-farm labour of 1.2 per cent (after adjusting for the change in the 
aggregate cost of living).
10 Farmers are also made worse off by the lower demand for farm land, the 
return from which is 5.5 per cent lower in 2007 following WTO accession reforms. Meanwhile, the 
real wages of skilled labour increase by 0.8 per cent, and the rewards to non-farm capital are 1.3 per 
cent higher. Together these results suggest the owners of non-farm capital gain almost the same in 
proportional terms as unskilled labourers in non-farm employment, but the latter do better than 
                                                 
10 The present version of the GTAP model has only one aggregate household, so it cannot distinguish between the 
different consumption bundles and factor endowments of different types of households. Throughout, real price changes 
refer to the change in price relative to the consumer price index change, given the consumption bundle of the aggregate 
household.    8
skilled workers. Hence on balance income inequality may improve slightly among non-farm 
households dependent mainly on labour income.
11  
However, income distribution can be expected to worsen as between farm and non-farm 
households, although the degree depends on the proportion of farm household income earned off 
the farm. With only 1.7 per cent of (or about 6 million) unskilled farm workers leaving agriculture 
for non-farm work (because of the assumed impediments to out-migration), and with land returns 
depressed by 5.5 per cent in addition to farm labour returns being 0.7 per cent lower, the gap 
between farm and non-farm incomes even within rural areas, and certainly between rural and urban 
areas, looks set to rise slightly unless remedial policy action is forthcoming. For farm households 
entirely dependent on earnings from agriculture (type A in Table 10), income would fall 1.6 per 
cent on average. This would differ little across the three regions identified in Table 7, since product 
shares for farm output – when fish products are ignored – are reasonably similar in western, central 
and eastern provinces. For farm households earning 30 per cent of their income from nonfarm 
unskilled work, however, that income fall is only half as large (0.8 per cent); and for farm 
households earning 60 per cent of their income from nonfarm unskilled work, their incomes would 
not decline at all (types B and C in Table 10 -- see rows 7 and 8). 
 
Sectoral details of the GTAP results are summarized in Table 9. Real consumer prices are lowered 
most by WTO accession for motor vehicles, oilseeds and sugar (and for beverages and tobacco, 
although if China was using import taxes on those items as a form of consumption tax and their 
decline were to be matched by an increase in domestic sales taxation, those price declines may not 
materialize). They are also lowered for textile products and to a lesser extent clothing. Among the 
farm products, consumer prices are raised slightly for livestock products, somewhat more for 
grains, and significantly for cotton (plant-based fibres). Producer prices are down more for farm 
products than for most other products except autos though, and farm output is down for all but 
cotton and meat. Moreover, feedgrain exports shrink by three-quarters and cotton exports by half 
with the abolition of export subsidies. The difference in the effects on production and consumption 
shown in Table 9 reveal that China’s food, feed and fibre self-sufficiency will be reduced at least 
slightly by these reforms. But the extent is really quite minor: the trade balance column in Table 9 
suggests that for all agricultural and food products, net imports would be greater because of the 
remaining accession reforms by only $3.96 billion per year by 2007 (in 1997 US dollars), which 
represents only 1 per cent of total imports. 
 
The above results depend as always on the assumptions in the model. To check the sensitivity of 
some of those assumptions, three alternative scenarios were run to compare their results with those 
in the base accession scenario: greater agricultural protection cuts; removing negative agricultural 
protection; and removing the wedge between farm and non-farm wages. 
 
Alternative scenario 1: greater agricultural protection cuts 
 
What if the grain, sugar and cotton NRPs were to drop to the in-quota tariff levels shown in Table 6, 
for example? An additional GTAP simulation was run and the differences for factor rewards are not 
huge in aggregate but they would be in the direction of worsening income inequality: unskilled farm 
wages would fall 0.9 instead of 0.7 per cent and rewards to farm land would fall 6.4 instead of 5.5 
per cent on the one hand, while on the other non-farm wages would rise 1.4 instead of 1.2 per cent 
for the unskilled and 1.0 instead of 0.8 per cent for skilled workers (Table 10). These changes 
would attract only another million workers from farms, given the assumed impediments of off-farm 
                                                 
11 Wages of skilled workers might increase more than suggested here as we do not capture the endogenous productivity 
growth resulting from the substantial liberalization of the service sectors.   9
migration. But while agricultural incomes would be lower, farm household income would not fall if 
at least 60 per cent of its income came from wages of non-farm unskilled labour (see row 8 of Table 
10). Domestic production of grains, sugar and cotton would be less though, and domestic 
consumption greater, so self-sufficiency in those products would be slightly lower. Even so, net 
imports of all food and agricultural products would be greater by only $1.5 billion per year by 2007 
($5.43 instead of $3.96 billion). Such an import increase would be within the tariff rate quotas for 
those items with the possible exception of maize (depending on the extent to which other feedgrains 
that are not TRQ-restricted, such as barley, are substitutable for maize). National economic welfare 
would be only very slightly greater in this case as compared with the core scenario (see bottom row 
of Table 10).  
 
Alternative scenario 2: removing negative agricultural protection  
 
If the negative NRPs for rice, meats, vegetables and fruits were to be raised to zero, the income 
distributional effects would go in the opposite direction to those in the previous alternative scenario 
(less inequality between farm and non-farm households). The changes are not great though, even 
though these products account for nearly 40 per cent of the value of food and agricultural output in 
China. As can be seen by comparing columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 10, they would involve about as 
much improvement in income distribution as the previous alternative scenario would worsen it.  
This case involves a 3 per cent larger national economic welfare gain than the core case (bottom row 
of Table 10). 
 
Alternative scenario 3: removing the wedge between farm and non-farm wages 
 
If one expected all off-farm migrants to go to rural rather than urban non-farm jobs, and if those 
migrants were just as adept at such non-farm work (e.g., because they are young or even just 
school-leavers and hence no different from other new entrants to unskilled rural non-farm work), 
the assumption above of a one-third wedge between farm and non-farm wages for the unskilled 
could be dropped.
12 Rerunning the model without that assumed wedge has significant impacts on the 
estimated number of farm workers moving to non-farm employment and on the industry composition 
of China's economy. Approximately 28 million people would leave their farm jobs as a result of 
accession if that barrier to farm out-migration was removed, compared with the estimated 6 or 7 
million people mentioned above when the hukou system remains in place.  
 
The impact on industry composition of removing that labour market distortion is substantial. WTO 
accession will have a much stronger positive impact on China's manufacturing and service sectors if 
the hukou system is abolished. This will allow more production of metals, automobiles and electronic 
equipment, and more services. That is possible in this scenario because factor use in farming and 
hence agricultural output are less, which also means more imports of food and agricultural products 
are needed ($10.2 billion by 2007 instead of the $3.96 in the core scenario).  
 
The consequences for income distribution are dramatic. Table 10 shows that this greater off-farm 
migration of workers would cause earnings of farm workers (mostly self-employed farmers) to rise 
because of WTO accession by 16.8 per cent, instead of falling by 0.7 per cent as in the core accession 
scenario. Even though the reduced demand for land would cause its rental value to fall more (9.7 
instead of 5.5 per cent), the farmers’ overall earnings from agriculture would be 6.8 per cent greater in 
this scenario – in stark contrast to the core scenario where they fall. True, the earnings of all other 
factor owners fall in this scenario, particularly unskilled nonfarm labour (by 3.8 per cent). However, 
                                                 
12 Evidence of increased flexibility in China’s labour markets in recent times is presented in Lohmar (2001).   10
given that farmers are among the country’s poorest households, this scenario suggests that WTO 
accession would reduce income inequality and poverty if the labour market distortion associated with 
the hukou system were to be reformed. It also suggests that the boost to national economic welfare in 
aggregate could be greater if WTO accession were to be accompanied by labour market reform: $11 
billion per year instead of just the $9.6 billion in the core accession scenario. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications  
 
The assumption in GTAP that all households are identical in their consumption patterns is of course 
a fiction. They differ as between urban and rural areas, between farm and non-farm households 
within rural areas, and within each of those groupings according to region and income level. Post-
simulation analysis at that level of detail is provided in Hertel, Zhao and Wang (2002) and Chen 
and Ravallion (2002). But even without that detail, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions 
about the implications of WTO accession for agriculture and for income distribution.  
 
Our initial analysis assuming no reform of the hukou system affecting labour market suggests rural 
non-farm incomes will rise on average absolutely and possibly even relative to urban incomes in the 
case of households depending just on labour income (assuming urban labourers are more skilled). 
However, some farm households facing increased import competition may be worse off in this case, 
ceteris paribus, if they are: 
•  unable to send household members to jobs in expanding industrial and service industries; 
•  are too poorly served with infrastructure to attract such activities to their own region; 
•  are unable to diversify into producing farm goods whose relative price has risen; and/or 
•  do not have relatives able to repatriate non-farm earnings to them.  
 
Thus in the core scenario the incidence of rural non-farm poverty will fall mainly because of the 
growth in wages for unskilled workers in rural non-farm activities, while poverty may well increase 
in agriculturally based hinterland provinces a long way from markets and in regions poorly served 
with the necessary infrastructure to attract investment in such expanding activities as textiles and 
clothing.  
 
The first alternative scenario shows that this situation would be exacerbated slightly if the TRQ-
protected items (grains, sugar and cotton) were to become even less protected than we initially 
assumed. By way of contrast, the second alternative scenario suggests the situation could be made 
slightly less extreme by removing the negative protection affecting rice, meats, vegetables and 
fruits. But both of these alternatives only involve small changes to the magnitudes of effects, rather 
than altering the sign of those effects, and both add only a small amount to the aggregate gains from 
trade liberalization. 
 
What the third alternative scenario makes clear, by way of contrast, is that the sign of the effects 
could be switched to favour the poorer farm households – albeit at the expense of the richer non-
farm ones – if the remaining WTO accession were to be accompanied by reform of the hukou 
system that allowed some members of those households to obtain higher-paying non-farm 
employment and repatriate earnings back to their farm family. And this case would involve a 
national economic welfare gain that is one-sixth above that in the core scenario without labour 
market reform. 
 
National self-sufficiency in food, feed and fibre will fall somewhat, particularly as demand for 
livestock products grows with income gains from trade reform and as production of natural fibre-
based textiles and clothing expand. But overall, most of these self-sufficiency effects of the   11
remaining reforms that are required following WTO accession are relatively very small in 
magnitude.
13 They would be largest in the third alternative case where labour market distortions are 
also removed. That is not to say food security would fall in that case though. It is changes in 
incomes of the poor, and hence in their capacity to purchase food, that affect food security, and in 
that third alternative scenario the poorest aggregate group (farm households that had been heavily 
dependent on agriculture) would gain most. 
 
What else should be done if the labour market were not to be reformed? If in that case some 
farmers’ incomes are to worsen relative to those of non-farm households, and if there is concern 
about the fall in agricultural self-sufficiency, it does not follow that trade reform should be 
abandoned. Rather, first-best ways of dealing with those concerns should be sought (and with any 
transitory unemployment that might follow reform). The most efficient policy responses are likely 
to involve investments in rural human capital, rural infrastructure and R&D (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 
2002), improvements in the land tenure system and rural financial markets, reductions in informal 
taxes/levies on farmers by local governments, and changes in grain marketing.  
 
First, the government might consider further investments in basic rural education and health 
services to reduce the adverse effect of trade reform on poverty incidence and perceived food 
security. Better education and health for farmers’ children not only boosts their farm productivity 
should they choose to stay on the farm after finishing school; it also increases their capacity to find 
more-lucrative off-farm work and to adjust to non-agricultural employment and living (Schultz 
1975). In addition to those longer-term benefits, there could also be an immediate poverty 
alleviating effect if the government were to cut basic school fees and make up the shortfall with a 
bigger direct grant to rural primary and middle schools.  
 
Second, improvements in rural infrastructure such as roads and rail mean that a larger share of the 
price eventually received at the end of the marketing chain for farm products can be passed back to 
farmers. Such improvements also lower the barrier for off-farm work by members of farm 
households, making it easier for them to take advantage of expanding employment opportunities in 
rural townships. 
 
Third, agricultural R&D can ease both urban and rural poverty (see Fan, Fang and Zhang 2001; 
Hazell and Haddad 2001). A boost in agricultural productivity could significantly offset the 2-8 per 
cent drop in agricultural production that is estimated in the core scenario to result from WTO 
accession. An important policy issue here is whether China should deny itself the use of GMOs in 
food production. Since our results suggest China would be exporting less food post-WTO accession 
and beyond, there is less sense in banning food GMOs in China if such a ban were to be imposed 
simply because of fears of otherwise being denied access into food markets abroad (Anderson and 
Yao 2002). 
 
Fourth, improvements in the land tenure system would not only increase the incentive to invest 
more in land but would also enhance the collateral of farm households. If accompanied by 
improvements in rural financial markets, investments by farmers back into agriculture would rise. 
They would rise further if returns were increased via reductions in informal taxes/levies on farmers 
by local governments. 
 
                                                 
13 They are especially small when compared with the changes that are taking place in the course of normal economic 
growth, as shown retrospectively in Tables 1-5 above and prospectively in earlier analyses by Anderson et al. (1997a, 
b).   12
And fifth, the government might reduce its regulation of grain marketing and in particular cease 
compulsory procurement from farmers at less than market prices and reduce the provision of grain 
to urban consumers at less than market prices. De-empahsising the Governors’ grain responsibility 
system (provincial self-sufficiency) would allow more exploitation of comparative advantage 
within China too. 
 
If all that was considered insufficient support for incomes of the poorest farm households, short-
term adjustment assistance via infra-marginal (and hence not output-inducing) producer price 
subsidies could be provided so as to boost their farm incomes without boosting farm output (in an 
equal but opposite way to that used to tax farmers in earlier decades –see Sicular 1988). Such an 
intervention could well be deemed WTO-consistent because of its decoupled nature, and in any case 
if it was just targeted to poor farmers it is unlikely to ever exceed 8.5 per cent of the value of 
China’s output of the product concerned (its de minimis exemption limit for product-specific 
support under Article 6.4 of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture). 
 
Finally, now that China is in the WTO it has the opportunity to take part in new rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations, whereby it can seek increased market access for its exports of farm 
(and other) products abroad. While not taken into account in the present paper, if WTO membership 
enhances China’s chances of expanding its access to agricultural more than other markets abroad in 
the future, that would be a positive benefit of WTO accession for China’s farmers and rural areas. 
Martin (2002) points out that Chinese farm exports face particularly high barriers abroad, so this 
potential benefit is non-trivial in principle (although in practice it may be difficult to secure, 
especially if the main barriers are SPS measures).
14 That proposition was tested recently by Yu and 
Frandsen (2002), also using the GTAP model. They find that reductions in barriers to agricultural 
imports and in domestic support to farmers in OECD countries reduces the extent to which China’s 
farm output would fall with WTO accession and in some cases leads to outputs expanding instead 
of contracting. As a consequence, China’s agricultural imports are reduced slightly and its 
agricultural exports are greater. These changes are reflected in Table 11: it shows that not only 
would China’s food self-sufficiency be higher with than without agricultural protection in the EU, 
US and Japan, but that the difference is in most cases more than enough to offset the fall in self 
sufficiency that is estimated to result from China’s WTO accession. Such reform in the OECD 
would clearly benefit farm households in China, providing a further pro-poor consequence of trade 
reform. 
                                                 
14 There is also the question of how China’s membership will alter the relative strengths of liberal versus protectionist 
forces in the next WTO rounds of multilateral farm trade negotiations. Mathews (2002) argues that China’s accession is 
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Table 1: Growth rates of China’s economy, 1970 to 2000 
 
(per cent per year) 
 
Reform period   Pre-reform
1970-78 1979-84 1985-95 1996-00 
Gross domestic product  4.9 8.5 9.7 8.2 
   Agriculture  2.7 7.1 4.0 3.4 
   Industry  6.8 8.2 12.8 9.6 
   Service  na 11.6 9.7 8.2 
   
Food production volume   
   Grain  2.8 4.7 1.7 0.03 
   Oilseed crops  2.1 14.9 4.4 5.6 
   Fruit  6.6 7.2 12.7 8.6 
   Red meat  4.4 9.1 8.8 6.5 
   Fish  5.0 7.9 13.7 10.2 
   
Value of output of non-farm 
rural enterprises   na 12.3 24.1
 
14.0 
   
Population 1.80 1.40 1.37 0.90 
   
Per capita GDP  3.1 7.1 8.3 7.1 
Note: Figures for GDP in 1970-78 are the growth rate of national income in real terms. Growth 
rates are computed using the regression method. Growth rates of individual and groups of 
commodities are based on volume of production data, while sectoral growth rates refer to value 
added in real terms. 
Source: SSB, Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues; MOA, Agricultural Yearbook of 
China, various issues.  
 
Table 2: Farm and rural enterprise (RE) developments in China, 1980 to 1999 
 
 















 (%)  (%)  (  %)    (ha/farm)  (%) 
1980 9  4  0    0.56  17 
1985 19  9  15    0.51  25 
1990 23  14  43    0.43  26 
1995 34  25  48    0.41  37 
1999 35  30  48    0.40  47 
 
Source: SSB, Statistical Yearbook of China, and China's TVE's Yearbook, various issues.   18
 
Table 3: The changing structure of China’s economy, 1970 to 2000 
 
(per cent, based on current prices) 
 
  1970  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Share of GDP         
    Agriculture  40  30  28  27  20  16 
        Industry  46  49 43 42 49 51 
    Services  13  21  29  31  31  33 
Share of employment         
    Agriculture  81  69  62  60  52  50 
        Industry  10  18 21 21 23 23 
        Services  9 13 17 19 25 27 
Share of agricultural output         
    Crops  82  76  69  65  58  56 
        Livestock  14  18 22 26 30 30 
    Fish  2  2  3  5  8  10 
    Forestry  2  4  5  4  3  4 
Share of population that is 
rural 
83  81 76 72 71 64 
 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; and China 


















Net imports  8 -1  6 
Change in stocks  1 11  45 
Consumption   339 384  403 
      Food – urban  35 42  44 
      Food -- rural  177 190  191 
      Feed  64 86  98 
      Other (seed, industrial use, waste)  63 66  70 
 
Source:  Huang (2001), based on SSB publications and the CCAP database.    19
Table 5: Structure of China’s food and feed trade (US$ million), 1980 to 1999 
 
  SITC  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
EXPORTS:      
Live animals  00  384 304 430 473 374 
Meat  01  361 448 791 1,349 1,054 
Dairy products  02  71 57 55 61 71 
Fish  03  380 283 1,370 2,875 2,969 
Grains  04  423 1,065 614 281 1,273 
Fruit and veg.  05  746 825 1,759 3,399 3,150 
Sugar  06  221 79 317 321 214 
Coffee and tea  07  328 435 534 523 561 
Animal feeds  08  58 241 623 351 239 
Other foods  09  49 66 107 290 541 
Oilseeds  22  na na na 522 373 
Vegetable oils  4  na na na 454 132 
TOTAL FOOD     3,021 3,803 6,600 10,899 10,951 
 
IMPORTS: 
    
Live animals  00  5 18 14 18 22 
Meat  01  1 6 54 97 503 
Dairy products  02  5 31 81 60 160 
Fish  03  13 44 102 609 890 
Grains  04  2,458 982 2,353 3,631 574 
Fruit and veg.  05  48 52 83 185 384 
Sugar  06  316 274 390 935 183 
Coffee and tea  07  56 40 30 74 72 
Animal feeds  08  14 83 182 423 620 
Other foods  09  2 23 46 92 182 
Oilseeds  22  na na na 110 1,531 
Vegetable oils  4  na na na 2,596 1,352 
TOTAL FOOD     2,918 1,553 3,335 8,828 6,474 
 
NET EXPORTS: 
    
Live animals  00  379 286 416 455 352 
Meat  01  360 442 737 1,252 551 
Dairy products  02  66 26 -26 1 -89 
Fish  03  367 239 1,268 2,266 2,079 
Grains  04  -2,035 83 -1,939 -3,350 663 
Fruit and veg.  05  698 773 1,676 3,214 2,766 
Sugar  06  -95 -195 -73 -614 31 
Coffee and tea  07  272 395 504 449 489 
Animal feeds  08  44 158 441 -72 -381 
Other foods  09  47 43 61 198 359 
Oilseeds  22  na na na 412 -1,158 
Vegetable oils  4  na Na na -2,142 -1,220 
TOTAL FOOD     103 2,250 3,265 2,071 4,477 
Source: Mathews (2002), based on UN COMTRADE statistics.   20














Rice -5  -5 -3 1 65  -3
Wheat 25  17 12 1 65  12
Coarse grains  20  28 20 1 65  32
Vegetables & fruits  -10  -8 -4 11 11  -4
Oilseeds 30  28 32 3 3  3
Sugar 44  42 40 15 50  20
Cotton 20  17 17 1 40  20
Meats -20  -19 -15 12 12  -15
Milk 30  30 30 11 11  11
 













     
Income per capita (Yuan in 1998)  4,090 5,280  9,690
   
Share of population that is rural (% in 1998)  81 75  71
   
Share of labour force in agriculture (% in 1998)  64 55  45
   
Share of national agricultural GDP (% in 2000)  17 34  49
   
Share of regional food output (% in 2000) due to:   
  Rice  8 11  6
  Wheat  5 5  4
  Maize  5 5  3
  Vegetables and fruits  11 10  14
  Oilseeds  4 6  3
  Sugar  0 0  1
  Cotton  3 2  1
  Dairy products  2 1  1
  Other livestock products  20 19  17
  Fish products  2 6  20
  Other food, agricultural and forest products  40 35  30
  TOTAL  100 100  100
 




Table 8:  Income and its distribution, rural and urban China, 1980 to 1999 
 




Real per capita net income 
(in 1999 yuan) 
Year   Rural  Poorest 
20% 
Coefficient Rural Urban  Urban/rural 
ratio 
1980   100  100  0.24  616  2062  3.4 
1985   189  165  0.26 1193  2605  2.2 
1990   218  177  0.31 1380  3217  2.3 
1995   272  193  0.33 1702  4713  2.8 
1999   349  252  0.35 2210  5854  2.7 
Note: The exchange rate was 8.28 yuan/US$ in 1999. 
 
Source: SSB, 1989-2000, and rural household income and expenditure surveys. 
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Table 9: Sectoral volume effects of China’s WTO accession reforms (core case), 2002 to 2007 
 

















Rice  -2.1 -0.1 6.1 -7.1 64 -0.9 0.9
Wheat  -2.0 0.0 18.9 -10.1 174 -1.7 0.4
Feedgrains  -2.3 -0.1 -77.8 -2.4 -596 -1.9 1.9
Vegetables and fruits  -3.4 0.1 14.6 -6.3 214 -1.9 -0.1
Oilseeds  -7.9 0.9 29.8 20.9 -789 -2.8 -4.7
Sugar  -6.5 0.6 13.9 24.1 -73 -1.9 -3.1
Plant based fibres  15.8 -0.6 -51.8 7.7 -189 0.1 3.1
Livestock & meat    1.3 0.0 15.5 -8.9 837 -1.6 0.2
Dairy  -2.0 0.0 13.5 23.8 -143 -1.5 0.2
Other food  -5.9 0.4 11.4 62.6 -3460 -1.7 -1.8
Beverages & tobacco  -33.0 1.5 9.7 112.4 -14222 -1.8 -6.9
Extractive industries  -1.0 -0.2 7.5 -4.4 2088 -0.7 1.2
Textiles  15.6 0.7 32.7 38.5 -10366 -1.7 -3.2
Apparel  57.3 0.5 105.8 30.9 49690 -0.6 -1.9
Light manufacturing  3.7 0.0 5.9 6.8 1786 -0.9 0.0
Petrochemical industry  -2.3 -0.2 3.1 11.8 -8810 -0.7 0.8
Metals  -2.1 -0.3 3.7 6.8 -1893 -0.4 1.3
Autos  1.4 1.0 27.7 24.0 516 -3.9 -4.2
Electronics  0.6 0.5 6.7 6.8 453 -1.3 -1.7
Other manufactures  -2.1 -0.2 4.1 18.9 -11291 -0.5 0.8
Trade and transport  0.0 -0.3 0.8 -0.4 493 -0.2 1.6
Construction  0.9 -0.4 2.7 17.5 -436 -0.2 1.7
Communication  -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 10.9 -56 0.1 1.9
Commercial services  -2.0 -0.5 -0.4 35.4 -1749 0.2 1.9
Other services  -1.7 -0.3 1.4 33.6 -1525 -0.1 1.6
  
Source: Authors’ GTAP results.  
Table 10: Change in China’s real factor prices and national economic welfare due to WTO 
accession, 2001 to 2007 
 















Alternative 3: core 
case plus also 
removing labour 
market distortion 
Farm unskilled wages  -0.7  -0.9  -0.5  16.8 
Rental price of land  -5.5  -6.4  -4.7  -9.7 
Nonfarm unskilled wages  1.2  1.4  1.1  -3.8 
Skilled labor wages  0.8  1.0  1.5  -1.7 
Rental price of capital  1.3  1.5  1.5  -1.4 
        
Farm household
a income-A  -1.6  -1.9  -1.3  6.8 
Farm household
a income-B  -0.8  -0.9  -0.6  3.6 
Farm household
a income-C  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4 
 
National economic welfare 
($ billion increase)   10.0 10.0  10.3  11.0 
 
a Farm income from agriculture is made up of 57% from unskilled labour, 26% from land and 17% 
from capital, according to the GTAP database. In 1999 on average 51% of rural household income 
in China was earned outside agriculture, mostly from unskilled labour. Therefore, to illustrate the 
importance of those off-farm earnings, three types of farm households are shown in this table: it is 
assumed nonfarm unskilled labour contributes 0% of farm household income for type A, 30% for 
type B, and 60% for type C.  
 
Source: Authors’ GTAP results. Table 11: Effect on agricultural self sufficiency of China’s WTO accession without and with cuts in 
agricultural protection in OECD countries 
 









no change in 
OECD policies
China’s WTO accession 
with EU, US and Japan 
removing agric tariffs, 
exports subsidies and 
domestic support
Rice 99.9 99.4 99.6
Wheat 93.0 88.2 89.1
Feedgrains 98.1 98.1 99.6
Vegetables and fruits  99.7 99.7 99.9
Oilseeds 81.0 81.3 82.3
Sugar 77.2 77.4 82.9
Plant-based fibres  83.8 83.7 83.9
Ruminant meat  88.5 88.2 89.4
Non-ruminant meat  97.7 97.8 98.9
Dairy products  81.8 80.0 84.9
 
     
 
 
Source: Yu and Frandsen (2002, Table 4). Appendix Table A: Cumulative (and annual) percentage growth rates over the period 1997-2007  
 






North America  11  11  12  49  High 
 (1.05)  (1.08)  (1.11)  (4.07)     
Western Europe  0  -1  1  30  High 
 (0.03)  (-0.08)  (0.07)  (2.69)     
Australia/New Zealand   10  12  10  55  High  
 (0.98)  (1.14)  (0.99)  (4.45)     
Japan 1  -2  -7  35  Medium   
 (0.06)  (-0.19)  (-0.71)  (3.02)     
China 8  13  50  174  High 
 (0.81)  (1.26)  (4.15)  (10.62)     
Taiwan, China  9  11  14  96  High 
 (0.86)  (1.05)  (1.36)  (6.97)     
Other NICs   10  -1  55  88  Medium 
 (0.93)  (-0.10)  (4.47)  (6.53)     
Indonesia 16  17  123  25  Low   
 (1.50)  (1.59)  (8.36)  (2.27)     
Vietnam 15  32  36  111  Medium 
 (1.40)  (2.79)  (3.10)  (7.78)   
Other Southeast Asia   18  22  134  60  Low  
 (1.70)  (2.04)  (8.87)  (4.83)     
India 18  23  78  88  Medium 
 (1.67)  (2.10)  (5.92)  (6.54)     
Other South Asia   25  30  80  72  Medium 
 (2.22)  (2.69)  (6.06)  (5.55)     
Brazil 14  19  72  31  Medium 
 (1.31)  (1.77)  (5.60)  (2.75)     
Other Latin America   18  6  90  54  Low 
 (1.68)  (0.57)  (6.65)  (4.42)     
Turkey 16  19  107  55  Low 
 (1.47)  (1.75)  (7.55)  (4.46)   
Other Middle East & North Africa   24  37  67  28  Low  
 (2.16)  (3.23)  (5.24)  (2.50)     
Economies in Transition   -1  6  9  33  High  
 (-0.11)  (0.56)  (0.90)  (2.88)     
South African Customs Union   15  31  47  34  Low  
 (1.39)  (2.76)  (3.92)  (2.94)     
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  30  40  54  38  Medium 
 (2.65)  (3.42)  (4.42)  (3.26)     
Rest of World   18  23  35  68  Low 
 (1.63)  (2.10)  (3.05)  (5.32)   
*The low, medium, and high growth assumptions for total factor productivity (TFP) in manufacturing correspond to 
annual growth rates of 0.1%, 1.0%, and above 2.0% (between 2% and 4%), respectively. 
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